President Bola Ahmed Tinubu will mark the third anniversary of his assumption of office on 29 May 2026. He came to power in 2023 on the promise of the Renewed Hope Agenda, a programme built around economic reform, national security, food security, infrastructure, energy, education, health, social investment, industrialisation, innovation and improved governance.
As he seeks a second term, the President’s central argument is that the difficult reforms of the first term must be consolidated. In his acceptance speech as the APC presidential flagbearer for the 2027 election, he argued that another four years of disciplined focus would place Nigeria on an irreversible path of economic expansion, industrialisation, energy security, infrastructure development, food sufficiency and democratic consolidation.
The question, therefore, is no longer whether President Tinubu has taken major decisions. He has. The more important question is whether those decisions have produced enough measurable progress to justify continuity. The fair answer is this: President Tinubu has built a strong and credible case for re-election, but the second-term mandate must now be anchored on the urgent conversion of macroeconomic reform gains into household relief, food security, jobs, power, security and inclusive prosperity.
The Renewed Hope Agenda was never going to be an easy political project because it required confronting distortions that had accumulated over many years. Fuel subsidy, multiple exchange rates, weak revenue mobilisation, fiscal leakages, power-sector liquidity problems, low productivity, insecurity and poor infrastructure were not new problems. They were inherited structural burdens.
The most important point in President Tinubu’s favour is that he did not merely manage these problems cosmetically. He confronted them directly. Fuel subsidy removal, exchange-rate reform, tax restructuring, efforts to improve public revenue, student loan financing, power-sector intervention and infrastructure expansion all point to an administration willing to take difficult decisions.
This is why the assessment of his record must be fair. The reforms imposed pain, but they were aimed at correcting unsustainable foundations. A country cannot permanently subsidise consumption with borrowed money, maintain artificial exchange rates, underfund infrastructure, weaken public revenue and still expect sustainable growth.
The strongest part of President Tinubu’s record is macroeconomic stabilisation. The economy has not collapsed under reform pressure. Rather, it has shown signs of recovery and expansion. Nigeria’s GDP grew by 3.89% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026. This was slightly below the 4.07% recorded in the fourth quarter of 2025, but higher than the 3.13% recorded in the first quarter of 2025. Full-year real GDP growth also improved to 3.87% in 2025 from 3.38% in 2024.
This is significant. It means that the economy is moving in a positive direction, even if the pace is not yet transformational. Nigeria still needs faster growth of about 6–7% annually to absorb its growing population, reduce poverty substantially, create jobs and expand opportunities. Nevertheless, the present growth trend provides a reasonable basis for the President’s argument that continuity can deepen the gains.
The World Bank’s April 2026 Nigeria Development Update also acknowledged that Nigeria has made meaningful progress in restoring macroeconomic stability after bold reforms. It noted that inflation had eased markedly, fiscal and external positions had strengthened, and growth remained robust, although household incomes had not fully recovered and poverty remained high.
That assessment captures the Tinubu record fairly: stabilisation is real, but the benefits must now reach ordinary Nigerians more visibly.
Another major achievement of the Tinubu administration is fiscal reform. For many years, Nigeria’s public finance system was weakened by low revenue mobilisation, excessive dependence on oil receipts, multiple and overlapping taxes, weak compliance, poor coordination among revenue agencies and inefficient public spending. These weaknesses limited government’s capacity to fund infrastructure, education, health, security, agriculture, power and social protection without resorting to heavy borrowing.
The signing of the four tax reform laws in June 2025 was therefore a major institutional intervention. These laws — the Nigeria Tax Act, the Nigeria Tax Administration Act, the Nigeria Revenue Service Act and the Joint Revenue Board Act — are intended to simplify tax administration, improve revenue mobilisation, reduce fragmentation, strengthen coordination among tiers of government and make the tax system more predictable for citizens, businesses and investors.
The importance of this reform is that Nigeria does not merely need more taxes; it needs a better tax system. A good tax system should be fair, simple, efficient and growth-supporting. It should widen the tax net without punishing productive citizens and businesses. It should reduce multiple taxation, minimise harassment by revenue officials, promote voluntary compliance and ensure that taxation supports enterprise rather than discouraging it.
This is why the reform is politically and economically significant. If properly implemented, it can strengthen government revenue, improve fiscal stability and reduce excessive dependence on borrowing. It can also give the government more room to fund roads, schools, hospitals, power projects, security operations, agricultural support and targeted social protection.
However, higher revenue alone is not development. Nigerians will not judge fiscal reform only by how much government collects. They will judge it by how well the money is used. The political value of revenue reform will depend on whether citizens can see better infrastructure, improved electricity, stronger security, affordable food, better schools, functional hospitals, social protection and visible reduction in waste.
The second-term agenda should therefore present revenue reform as a reform dividend programme. Citizens should be able to see clearly how additional revenue from tax reform, subsidy removal, exchange-rate reform and improved oil-sector earnings is being converted into public goods. A transparent public reporting system should show what is collected, where it is spent, what projects are funded and what results are achieved.
In this sense, Tinubu’s fiscal reform is an important foundation for continuity. It has begun the process of strengthening the fiscal capacity of the Nigerian state. The next task is to ensure that increased revenue is matched by spending discipline, transparency, value-for-money procurement and visible development outcomes. That is how revenue reform can become a practical instrument for growth, public trust and national renewal.
One concern that the re-election campaign must address directly is the high cost of governance and the country’s continued reliance on borrowing to finance development. These concerns are legitimate because citizens are more willing to support reform when they see discipline, sacrifice and prudence in government.
President Tinubu’s first term has focused strongly on fiscal correction through subsidy reform, exchange-rate reform, revenue mobilisation and tax restructuring. The next phase should deepen this by making fiscal discipline more visible. A second-term Renewed Hope agenda should therefore include a clear programme to reduce waste, control non-essential recurrent expenditure, limit unnecessary official travel, rationalise overlapping agencies, strengthen procurement transparency and ensure better value for money in public spending.
The campaign should make the point that reform must not be borne by citizens alone. Government must also show restraint. A leaner, more disciplined and more accountable public sector will strengthen public trust and make the reform message more morally persuasive.
On borrowing, the administration should not promise that Nigeria will never borrow. That would be unrealistic. The better and more credible promise is responsible borrowing. Loans should be tied only to productive projects that can reduce logistics costs, expand power supply, improve security, support agriculture, deepen industrialisation, raise exports and strengthen future revenue.
This distinction is important. Developmental borrowing can be justified when it finances roads, rail, ports, power, irrigation, digital infrastructure and other assets that expand productivity. But borrowing becomes dangerous when it increases debt service without creating growth. President Tinubu himself has acknowledged the pressure of debt servicing, noting that Nigeria is projected to spend about $11.6 billion on debt payments in 2026, nearly half of projected government revenue.
Therefore, every major loan should be accompanied by clear information on project cost, financing terms, repayment plan, completion timeline and expected economic benefit. Nigerians should know not only that government is borrowing, but why it is borrowing, what the money will produce, and how the investment will improve national productivity.
The second-term agenda should therefore be built around a simple fiscal principle: collect more fairly, spend more wisely, borrow more responsibly and deliver more visibly.
If this principle is clearly communicated and faithfully implemented, concerns about the cost of governance and foreign borrowing can be converted into a positive argument for continuity. The message would be that President Tinubu has begun fiscal reform, but the next four years will consolidate it through discipline, transparency, productivity and stronger public accountability.
The exchange-rate reform was one of the most painful decisions of the Tinubu administration. It contributed to inflationary pressure and higher import costs. Yet it also addressed a distorted foreign-exchange system that had discouraged investment, encouraged arbitrage and weakened confidence.
The improvement in external reserves and investor confidence strengthens the administration’s argument. Reuters reported that Nigeria’s net foreign-exchange reserves rose to $34.8 billion by the end of 2025, compared with $23.11 billion a year earlier and $3.99 billion two years earlier. Gross reserves were also reported at $45.71 billion at the end of 2025 and $50.45 billion by mid-February 2026.
This is important because no economy can sustain growth without external stability. However, the next phase must ensure that exchange-rate reform supports production, exports, local manufacturing, agro-processing, digital services, tourism and import substitution. A market-reflective exchange rate is useful only when it helps the economy produce more, export more and earn more.
In the second term, the administration should therefore connect exchange-rate reform more directly to export promotion, domestic value addition and foreign-exchange earnings. The country must produce more of what it consumes and export more of what the world needs. That is how foreign-exchange reform can move from adjustment pain to productive advantage.
The greatest challenge to the re-election case remains the cost of living. Inflation has eased compared with earlier peaks, but prices remain high. CBN data show headline inflation at 15.69% in April 2026, up from 15.38% in March 2026, while food inflation stood at 16.06% in April 2026.
This means that although macroeconomic stabilisation is improving, many households still feel pressure from food prices, transport costs, rent, school fees, healthcare and small business expenses. This is the area where the administration must speak with humility, urgency and practical compassion. Macroeconomic indicators may be improving, but ordinary citizens judge reform by what happens in the market, at the fuel station, in school fee payment, in rent renewal, in transportation and in household feeding.
The first task is to attack food inflation quickly. Food security should be treated not only as a long-term agricultural policy, but as an immediate anti-inflation strategy. The government should intensify support for dry-season farming, irrigation, fertiliser access, improved seedlings, mechanisation, storage, rural roads and security for farming communities. It should also work with states to remove bottlenecks in food movement, reduce illegal levies on farm produce, discourage hoarding and improve market supply. When food moves faster and cheaper from farms to markets, prices can begin to moderate.
The second urgent area is transport relief. Fuel subsidy should not be restored in its old wasteful form, but government can reduce hardship through targeted transport support. This may include support for mass transit buses, compressed natural gas vehicles, rail movement of goods, reduced transport levies and special transport arrangements for workers, students and vulnerable communities. Since transport cost enters almost every commodity price, lowering transport pressure can help reduce inflation across the economy.
The third area is targeted social protection. Poor and vulnerable households should receive direct and transparent support through verified social registers, school feeding, health insurance support, food vouchers in high-pressure areas and temporary relief for low-income workers. This should not become another general subsidy. It should be targeted, time-bound, monitored and tied to clear welfare objectives.
The fourth area is support for small businesses and productive households. Many small traders, farmers, artisans and manufacturers are struggling with higher costs of inputs, energy, rent and credit. The administration should expand low-interest productive credit, working-capital support, credit guarantees and tax relief for micro and small businesses that create jobs or produce essential goods. Helping small businesses survive is also a way of protecting employment and household income.
The fifth area is stronger market monitoring and competition enforcement. Government should not control prices recklessly, but it must prevent artificial scarcity, extortionate levies, cartel behaviour, hoarding and exploitative middleman practices. Inflation cannot be reduced only from Abuja. Federal, state and local authorities must work together to reduce the hidden costs that traders, transporters and consumers face across the supply chain.
The President’s second-term message should therefore be clear: the first term corrected direction; the second term must reduce hardship. The campaign should not deny the pain of reform. It should explain the purpose of the pain, show the practical path from reform to relief, and demonstrate that the administration is moving quickly to convert stabilisation into lower food prices, lower transport pressure, stronger household income and better living conditions.
If these measures are implemented with urgency, the administration can reduce reform-induced hardship without reversing the reforms themselves. That is the correct balance: preserve macroeconomic discipline, but protect the people; sustain reform, but soften its harshest effects; stabilise the economy, but make recovery visible in the lives of ordinary Nigerians.
One of the most visible achievements of the administration is the Nigerian Education Loan Fund. In his acceptance speech, President Tinubu cited the establishment of NELFUND as one of the administration’s major social interventions.
This is an important step because education financing has long been a burden on Nigerian families. However, a full human-capital agenda must go beyond student loans. Nigeria needs stronger basic education, teacher quality, technical training, digital skills, primary healthcare, nutrition and early childhood development.
The World Bank’s April 2026 Nigeria Development Update placed strong emphasis on early childhood development, noting that long-term productivity depends on investing in people from the earliest years.
This should become a major second-term priority. The education loan scheme is a useful opening, but the next stage should build a full productivity pipeline: healthy children, literate pupils, skilled youths, employable graduates, technical artisans and innovative entrepreneurs.
Power remains both a challenge and an opportunity. President Tinubu has taken steps to address legacy debts, metering and liquidity problems in the electricity market. The Presidency reported in April 2026 that he approved a ₦3.3 trillion payment plan to settle outstanding power-sector legacy debts accumulated over more than a decade.
This intervention is significant because the power sector cannot function properly when generation companies, gas suppliers and distribution companies are trapped in debt and liquidity crises. However, Nigerians will judge success not by debt-settlement announcements alone, but by hours of reliable electricity supplied to homes, schools, hospitals, farms, factories and small businesses.
The second-term target should be practical and measurable: more metering, improved transmission, stronger distribution accountability, embedded power, state electricity markets, gas-to-power reliability and better supply to industrial clusters.
If power supply improves, the benefits will be felt across the whole economy. Manufacturers will reduce diesel dependence. Small businesses will lower production costs. Hospitals and schools will function better. Farmers and agro-processors will preserve and process more produce. In this sense, power reform is not only an energy issue; it is a productivity, employment and cost-of-living issue.
Food security must become the most important welfare pillar of the second-term agenda. Nigeria’s reform story will become more politically persuasive when citizens see lower food prices and better food availability.
Agriculture is also the sector that connects macroeconomic reform to rural livelihoods. Many poor Nigerians depend directly or indirectly on farming, trading, transport, food processing and rural markets. If agriculture improves, poverty reduction becomes more realistic.
The administration should therefore treat food security as a national emergency. The priorities should be farm security, irrigation, mechanisation, fertiliser access, rural roads, storage, extension services, commodity logistics, agro-processing and credit for farmers. The President’s re-election campaign should make food affordability one of its strongest promises because it is the most direct way ordinary Nigerians will feel reform dividends.
Food security should also be handled in partnership with the states. Land, rural roads, extension systems, local security and markets are heavily influenced by state and local authorities. The Federal Government can lead, coordinate and finance, but implementation must reach farming communities directly.
No growth path can be irreversible without security. Farmers cannot farm, traders cannot travel, investors cannot invest, children cannot learn and communities cannot prosper where insecurity persists.
President Tinubu deserves credit for acknowledging the seriousness of the challenge and declaring a nationwide security emergency in November 2025, with orders for additional recruitment into the armed forces and police. The State House said the police would recruit an additional 20,000 officers, while the army was also authorised to recruit more personnel.
This was a necessary step, but recruitment alone is not enough. The next phase must be intelligence-led, technology-supported, locally grounded and institutionally accountable. State police, forest guards, community intelligence, border control, prosecution of criminal networks and disruption of ransom finance should form part of an integrated security doctrine.
Security is not only a law-and-order matter. It is also economic policy. If insecurity is reduced, agriculture will expand, rural markets will recover, mining will become safer, schools will reopen more confidently, and investors will take more risk. Security improvement is therefore one of the fastest ways to unlock growth.
Tinubu’s development argument rests heavily on infrastructure and production. This is appropriate. Nigeria cannot achieve irreversible growth without roads, rail, ports, power, housing, irrigation, broadband, industrial parks and efficient logistics.
However, infrastructure should not be treated merely as visible construction. It must reduce the cost of doing business, connect farmers to markets, reduce transport costs, support exports, open rural economies and improve access to jobs and services.
The second-term agenda should therefore connect infrastructure directly to productivity. Roads should connect farms, factories, markets and ports. Rail should move goods, not only passengers. Ports should reduce delays and costs. Housing should create jobs and deepen local building-material industries. Digital infrastructure should support innovation, e-commerce, education, fintech and public service delivery.
The real-sector message should be simple: Nigeria must move from import dependence to production, from raw commodity export to value addition, and from consumption-led growth to productivity-led growth.
Oil and gas remain critical to Nigeria’s foreign-exchange earnings, public revenue and industrial strategy. Tinubu’s reforms in the petroleum sector, including efforts to improve investment confidence, raise production, support domestic refining and strengthen revenue governance, are central to the recovery agenda.
The second term should deepen this direction by focusing on crude oil production security, refinery reliability, gas-to-power, LPG expansion, petrochemicals, fertiliser feedstock, pipeline security and petroleum revenue transparency.
Energy security should not be limited to fuel availability. It should include domestic refining capacity, strategic fuel reserves, gas-based industrialisation, stable power supply and reduced vulnerability to external shocks.
If Nigeria can increase crude production, improve domestic refining, expand gas use and strengthen petroleum revenue governance, the country will gain foreign exchange, reduce import pressure, support industrialisation and protect citizens better from global energy shocks.
The administration’s reform credibility will be strengthened if government itself is seen to sacrifice. Nigerians are more willing to endure reform when they see discipline, prudence and accountability in public office.
This is why the second-term agenda should include a strong commitment to reducing waste, improving procurement transparency, strengthening audit systems, publishing project data, enforcing value-for-money rules and lowering the visible cost of governance.
Government should also communicate better. Many policies are not fully understood by citizens because they are explained in technical language. Reform must be translated into everyday meaning: what it does for food, jobs, school fees, electricity, transport, health, business and security.
A reforming government must not only implement policy; it must carry the people along. Trust is itself an economic asset. When citizens trust that reforms are purposeful and fairly managed, they are more likely to support continuity.
On balance, President Tinubu has a credible and persuasive case for re-election. The basis of that case is not that all problems have been solved. They have not. The basis is that he has taken difficult decisions, restored a more serious policy direction, improved macroeconomic stability, strengthened fiscal reform, expanded external reserves, initiated tax restructuring, intervened in education financing, addressed power-sector debts and placed reform continuity at the centre of national debate.
This is a substantial record within three years.
The stronger argument for re-election is that the first term was the foundation-laying phase. It corrected direction, confronted distortions and restored policy seriousness. The second term should be the consolidation phase: reducing hardship, expanding production, improving security, lowering food costs, deepening infrastructure, strengthening human capital and making growth visible in the lives of ordinary Nigerians.
In that sense, the case for re-election is not merely political. It is developmental. Nigeria should not abandon a difficult reform journey at the point when stabilisation is beginning to appear. The better path is to consolidate the reforms, correct implementation weaknesses and convert macroeconomic gains into social and economic dividends.
The second-term campaign should be built around a clear and measurable Renewed Hope Consolidation Plan. This should include specific targets for inflation reduction, food affordability, GDP growth, job creation, poverty reduction, power supply, crude oil production, domestic refining, school access, healthcare, security, exports and infrastructure completion.
The administration should also publish a Reform Dividend Dashboard showing how savings and additional revenues from reforms are being used. Citizens should see what subsidy removal, tax reform, exchange-rate reform and improved oil revenue are funding.
Food security should be treated as the first practical test of the second term. If food prices stabilise and begin to fall, the reform message will become easier for citizens to believe.
Security should be handled as both a national safety priority and an economic recovery strategy. Without security, agriculture, mining, transport, tourism, investment and schooling will remain vulnerable.
Power should be measured by hours of electricity supplied to homes and businesses, not simply by megawatts announced or debts settled.
Fiscal discipline should also be made visible. The administration should promise lower waste, responsible borrowing, better procurement, transparent project reporting and stronger value-for-money discipline.
Finally, the administration should make visible efforts to reduce the cost of governance. Shared sacrifice will strengthen the moral legitimacy of reform.
President Tinubu’s first three years have been consequential. He has not governed as a caretaker president. He has governed as a reform president. He has taken decisions that reshaped Nigeria’s fiscal, monetary and economic policy environment. Some of these decisions imposed hardship, but they also began correcting distortions that had become unsustainable.
The objective verdict is therefore balanced but positive. Tinubu has achieved meaningful macroeconomic stabilisation, revenue reform, tax restructuring, external reserve recovery, education financing and some power-sector restructuring. He has also made security, food sufficiency, infrastructure and industrialisation central to the second-term argument.
The unfinished task is to make the reforms more visible in the lives of ordinary Nigerians. The next phase must move from stabilisation to prosperity, from reform pain to reform dividend, from policy correction to household relief, and from economic adjustment to inclusive growth.
Does President Tinubu deserve re-election? On the evidence of courage, reform direction, macroeconomic recovery and the need for continuity, yes, he has made a strong case for re-election. But that mandate should be understood as a mandate to consolidate, humanise and deepen the Renewed Hope Agenda.
The final message is therefore clear:
President Tinubu has laid a difficult reform foundation. The next four years should consolidate the gains, reduce hardship, expand production, strengthen security, create jobs, enforce fiscal discipline and place Nigeria on a truly irreversible growth path.
That is the case for continuity. That is the case for re-election.
Central Bank of Nigeria. (2026). Inflation rates: April 2026.
Federal Ministry of Finance. (2026). Nigeria records over 4% GDP growth in Q4 2025, signaling broad-based economic growth and momentum.
PwC Nigeria. (2025). The Nigerian Tax Reform Acts.
Reuters. (2026). Nigeria economic growth slows slightly in first quarter.
Reuters. (2026). Nigeria’s net FX reserves surge to $34.8 billion in 2025, central bank says.
Reuters. (2026). Nigeria’s Tinubu urges global finance overhaul as debt costs crowd out spending.
State House, Abuja. (2025). President Tinubu declares a security emergency, orders army, police to recruit more personnel.
State House, Abuja. (2026). Acceptance speech by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, GCFR, on his nomination as APC presidential flagbearer for the 2027 election.
State House, Abuja. (2026). Power sector reform: President Tinubu approves ₦3.3 trillion payment plan to restore reliable electricity.
World Bank. (2026). Nigeria Development Update: Nigeria’s tomorrow must start today — The case for early childhood development.
